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Measuring the direct economic cost of the 
terrorist attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid. 
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and JAVIER GONZÁLEZ GOMEZ *  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper measures the direct costs that the terrorist attacks of March 11 caused on the 
economy of the region of Madrid. The evaluation has been made applying a 
conservative criterion, and the results obtained have to be considered as minimum. The 
result indicates that the terrorist attacks caused a loss of nearly 212 million euros to the 
regional economy of Madrid, equivalent to 0,16 per cent of the regional GDP (0,03 of 
the national GDP). This confirms that the immediate economic dimension of a terrorist 
attack such as the one of March 11 —apart from human catastrophic consequences— is 
relatively low. 
 
Keywords: Terrorism, Costs of Terrorism, Terrorist Attacks March 11, Region of 
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working paper by the same authors “Evaluación del coste directo de los atentados 
terroristas del 11 M para la economía de la Comunidad de Madrid”, Working paper 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At 7:39 a.m. of March 11, 2004, and without any previous warning, in the 
middle of the rush hour, three backpacks exploded in a suburban train entering the 
Atocha Railway Station of Madrid. Another four exploded in a convoy that was 
circulating near Atocha Station. Simultaneously, one more exploded in a train standing 
at the Santa Eugenia Station —one of Madrid’s East districts— while two more 
exploded inside the Station of El Pozo del Tío Raimundo, located in the southeast of 
Madrid. First estimations given by the experts on explosives of the national security 
forces indicated that the terrorists had planted between thirteen and fifteen bombs in 
order to commit the cruellest and most devastating terrorist attack in the history of 
Spain.1 
 
Immediately after the attacks, the emergency services started to work. The 
Madrid Metro and Atocha Station were closed to the citizens and the first wounded were 
treated in the field hospitals that were put to use in the areas surroundings the places of 
the explosions. 
 
At the beginning, the injured were transferred in ambulances, buses, police cars 
and private vehicles to the main hospitals of Madrid (Gregorio Marañón, 12th of 
October, La Paz and La Princesa) which, according to the Emergency Plan coordinated 
by the 112 emergency service, evacuated the slightly injured to their homes, in order to 
avoid a collapse. 
 
The citizens responded in an excellent way to the calls of the health services 
asking for blood donations. At the last hours of the morning it was no longer necessary, 
in spite of the incessant activity of all the hospitals of Madrid. 
The dead were taken to the Pavilion number 6 of IFEMA (one of Madrid’s Trade Fair 
sites), where a group of forensic surgeons was in charge of identifying the corpses. In 
total, 191 people lost their life and more than 1.500 were injured. 
 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of the attacks of March 11 is to be found in the works of E. de 
Diego, Días de Infamia, (Madrid; Letras Libres 2004); C. García Abadillo, 11-M, La 
venganza, (Madrid; La Esfera de los Libros 2004) and C. Álvarez de Toledo, 4 días de 
marzo, (Barcelona; Ed. Planeta 2004). With analytically larger claims about the Islamic 
terrorist phenomenon and its incidence in the case that centres our attention here, see the 
works of F. Reinares y A. Elorza, El Nuevo terrorismo islamista, (Madrid, Temas de 
Hoy 2004) and A. Blanco, R. del Águila and J.M. Sabucedo, Madrid 11-M. Un análisis 
del mal y sus consecuencias, (Madrid; Trotta 2005). On the internal political conext and 
the reactions of Spanish society to the attacks, see the interesting contribution of E. 
Uriarte, Terrorismo y democracia tras el 11–M,  (Madrid; Espasa 2004). On the 
solidarity with the victims, it is important to make reference to the work F. Benzo, 
Héroes inesperados. La otra cara del 11-M, (Madrid; Temas de hoy 2004). 
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Spain had been suffering terrorist attacks from different organizations from 1968 
onwards,2 but those perpetrated on March 11, by a group of islamistic terrorists,3 were 
the cruellest and most devastating up to that time.  
In recent years, terrorism has become one of mankind’s biggest threats. 
Globalisation has put many countries within the transnational, and even international,4 
terrorists’ reach. National borders do not present nearly impassable barriers any longer. 
The threat has extended, becoming a general one and, as has been proven by the most 
recent attacks, has steadily increased its scale. 
 
The costs derived from this sort of attack have an immediate manifestation in the 
destruction of human lives, of infrastructures and of other tangible assets, as well as in 
the efforts that its society must realize to palliate the effects of the violence. In general, 
these costs, even when the attacks are of great dimension, tend not to be very significant 
in terms of the size of the attacked economy. But if terrorism persists, the indirect costs 
to be registered can be very important.  
 
                                                 
2 From 1968 onwards, when ETA began to carry out terrorist attacks, the balance of mortal victims of this 
organization reaches in total a number of more than 800, among them Guardias Civiles, National Police 
and civil victims. 
3 Nevertheless, it was not the first Islamic attack perpetrated in Madrid. On April 12, 1985, Madrid had 
suffered an attack claimed by Islamic Yihad. It was carried out in the restaurant El Recreo, frequented by 
Americans, with the result of 18 dead (all Spaniards) and 84 wounded, of which 11 were American 
citizens. 
4 The economic literature on terrorism defines International or Transnational Terrorism as an attack 
carried out in a country that affects victims, objectives, institutions, governments or citizens of another 
country or either gives rise to consequences of costs and benefits on people and properties in other 
countries. But, occasionally, it is necessary to specify a little more. Fernando Reinares considers that, 
although International and Transnational Terrorism are often confused, the latter includes the former, but 
not the other way around. According to this author, Transnational Terrorism is characterized by the fact 
that “those who carry it out maintain organizational structures or develop activities in more than one 
country”. Nevertheless, it seems difficult nowadays to keep a terrorist structure of solely domestic 
character. See also Fernando Reinares, ‘Conceptualizando el terrorismo internacional’, Análisis Real 
Instituto Elcano, 2005. 
On the other hand, International Terrorism differs from the previous type because “it is practiced with the 
deliberate intention of affecting the structure and distribution of power in whole areas of the planet or 
even on a worldwide scale”. This second group includes the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, those 
of September 11, 2001 in New York, those of October 12, 2002 in Bali, and the most recent ones of July 
2005 in London. 
This differentiation is especially important in the case of Spain, as, although it has a 
long experience in attacks of a transnational character, and devoted a large amount of 
resources to counteracting it, the unexpected attack of March 11 and its international 
character, has led it to review the defence and antiterrorist policies, now also focusing 
on the external threat. On the economic consequences of the terrorist attacks of ETA, 
see: A. Abadie and J. Gardeazabal, ‘The economic costs of conflict: a case control study 
for the Basque country’, NBR Working Paper, 8478, 2001, M. Buesa (dir.), Economía 
de la secesión. El proyecto nacionalista y el País Vasco, (Madrid; Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales 2004), W. Enders and T. Sandler, ‘Causality between Transnational Terrorism 
on tourism: the case of Spain’, Tourism, 14 (1), 1991, pp. 49-58 and W. Enders and T. 
Sandler, ‘Terrorism and Foreign Direct Investment in Spain and Greece’, Kyklos, 49 
(3), 1996, pp. 331-352.   
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For the purposes of our analysis, we have differentiated between short term costs 
and costs in the medium and long term,5 dividing these again into direct and indirect 
costs. Therefore in the present study on the economic consequences of March 11, we 
have distinguished the following main aspects: 
 
 
 
1) Short term costs: 
  
a) Direct Costs: they include the costs that are an immediate consequence of the 
attacks and result from the loss of human lives and the attendance of the injured; loss of 
property (buildings, infrastructures, etc) and possessions (furniture, vehicles, 
transportation equipment); costs of care and immediate security after the attack (firemen 
and police); costs of removing the debris; costs of immediate psychological help to the 
survivors of the attack and the families of the victims, losses due to pauses or delays in 
the economic activities affected directly or indirectly by the attacks. 
  
b) Indirect costs: they are the costs that correspond to the short term damage 
inflicted on productive activity, such as losses in tourism due to the fear of new attacks, 
with losses in hotel occupation, in the use of such services as shows, restaurants, etc. 
This would also include the costs stemming from uncertainty in the behaviour of the 
consumers and the investors and the effects of restriction in specific or local industries 
mentioned by Saxton (2002). 
 
2) Medium and long term: 
  
a) The only direct costs in the medium or long term that may result from the 
attacks are those of the rehabilitation of the affected areas, given that they indeed have 
this dimension. For example, in the case of the September 11 the costs derived from the 
new design of the “ground zero” and the work on construction of the new buildings 
could be viewed as long term. Direct long term costs would also include the costs 
involved in helping to the relatives of the victims if they are established in the form of 
payment of salaries of life-long help, or the disability pensions for injured survivors. 
  
b) Most are indirect costs. These include the costs of the re-routing of the tourism 
permanently toward other areas (for example if they do not recover the levels and trend 
of the tourism before the attack). They also include most of the costs pointed out by Frey 
                                                 
5 By doing so, we follow an approach similar to that of J. Saxton, The economic costs of 
terrorism, (Washington DC, Joint Economic Committee 2002), who considers the 
following short term costs: (1) Immediate loss of human and non-human capital; (2) 
Effects of uncertainty on the behaviour of the consumers and investors; (3) Effects of 
restriction on specific or local industries. 
These are completed by following long term costs: (1) increased costs of security; (2) 
Displacement of productive activity caused by the increased budget destined to fight 
terrorism; (3) Other long term costs derived from the permanent threat, such as anxiety, 
stress, etc. [Cfr. Also B. Frey, S. Luechinger, A. Stutzer, ‘Calculating tragedy: assessing 
the costs of terrorism’, CESifo Working Paper, 1341, 2004.] 
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et al. (2004) such as re-routing of direct foreign investment, the decrease of 
consumption, a general reduction in investment, increased security expenditures, 
reduction of economic growth, and reduction of foreign transactions and lags in 
productive activity due to higher safety measures. They also include the long term ones 
mentioned by Saxton (2002): increased security costs, rise in costs for the antiterrorist 
fight, and costs derived from the sensation of permanent threat. 
 
The valuation of all these costs presents some problems, especially in those cases 
that refer to changes in the economic activity and, in general, to the long term costs 
which other facts or events may involve. Saxton (2002), when evaluating the costs 
derived from September 11 highlights three main obstacles:  
 
1) Measurement problems: The most important forms of long term costs are 
frequently the most complicated to value. Frictions, inefficiencies or costs of 
transactions, for example, are important but difficult to quantify. 
 
2) Particular aspects of the macroeconomic costs of terrorism: Another reason to 
treat the obtained results with caution is that the estimations can be partial, due to 
the fact that aspects associated with the new forms of terrorism cannot be included 
in the cost evaluation of “traditional” terrorism, e.g. the costs of prevention of 
nuclear or biological terrorism. 
 
3) Characteristics of terrorist behaviour: Terrorism differs from other series of 
disasters in the fact that the terrorist organizations act with a certain “rationality”. 
When the controls or institutions raise the costs, making the use of violence in 
political action more difficult, the terrorists will change quickly to another, less 
expensive form, of causing damage. 
 
In synthesis, we observe that in spite of the uncertainty that surrounds the 
economic valuation of the terrorist attacks, there is a valuable and considerable effect as 
far as macroeconomic aspects, are concerned mainly in important sectors for the 
economy like those ones previously mentioned. 
 
For the valuation of the September 11 attack in New York several studies have 
been carried out,6 which, nevertheless, are difficult to compare, according to the very 
                                                 
6 This fact is pointed out by the General Accounting Office, Impact of Terrorist Attacks 
on the World Trade Center, (Washington, DC; GAO 2002) and Saxton (2002). From the 
important list of publications referring to the consequences of September 11, we may 
pick out the following: New York City Office of the Comptroller, ‘The impact of the 
September 11 WTC Attack on NYC’s Economy and City Revenues’, October 4, 2001; 
J. Bram, J. Orr, C. Rapaport, ‘Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on 
New York City’, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, November 2002; Fiscal Policy 
Institute, The Employment Impact of the September 11 World Trade Center Attacks: 
Updated Estimates Based on the Benchmarked Employment Data, (New York; FPI 
2001); Fiscal Policy Institute, World Trade Center Job Impacts Take a Heavy Toll on 
Low Wage Workers (New York; FPI 2001); International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook – The Global Economy After September 11, (City; IMF 2001); 
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same experts that have analyzed them. Some of the comparison problems come from the 
different level of analysis (local, state or national consequences),7 or of the estimation of 
only certain categories of losses; others, because of the absence of an explanation of the 
methodology followed, and some may fall into the error of doubling the costs.  
 
In the specific case that centres our attention, the evaluation of the direct costs 
caused by the attacks of 11 M on the economy of the Region of Madrid, we have kept in 
mind the following aspects: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Milken Institute, The impact of September 11 on U.S. Metropolitan Economies, (Santa 
Monica, Milken Institute 2002); New York Governor and State Division of the Budget, 
Rebuild New York–Renew America: The World Trade Center Attacks; Current 
Estimated Cost, and other supporting documents, (New York; October 9, 2001); New 
York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce, Economic Impact of the September 
11th Attack on New York City, (New York; November 2001; rev. February 11, 2002); 
New York State Assembly Ways and Means Committee Staff, New York State 
Economic Report, (New York; March 2002); New York State Senate Finance 
Committee Staff, ‘Financial Impact of the World Trade Center Impact’, prepared by 
DRI-WEFA, January 2002; OECD, ‘Economic Consequences of Terrorism’, OECD 
Economic Outlook, June 2002 and OECD, The impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 on international trading and transport activities, (Paris, Working Party 
of trade Committee, TD/TC/WP(2002) 9/FINAL, March 2002). These studies mainly 
take into account the following costs: Direct costs: Human lives; Property loss: 
buildings, business fixtures, computer equipment, phone and power utilities, subway 
stations, plans, vehicles; Costs to respond to the emergency, remove debris, stabilize 
buildings, and clean up; Health effects, injuries, and emotional distress; and costs to 
provide temporary living assistance. Indirect costs: Lost employee income and business 
profits associated with firms closed or cut back, temporarily or permanently, because 
office space and infrastructure were destroyed or damaged; Lost employee income and 
business profits associated with other firms that depend on those that closed or cut back; 
Spending reductions from other income losses triggered by the firms that closed or cut 
back; Fiscal impacts such as reduced tax revenues; and Delays to travellers and 
commuters. Academic studies have also been carried out, although, especially in the 
valuation of the immediate and direct costs, they take references of the “official” 
studies. As for example: G. Becker and K. Murphy, ‘Prosperity Hill Rise Out of the 
Ashes’, Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2001; P.Lenain, M. Bonturi and V. Koen, ‘The 
Economic Consequences of Terrorism’, OECD Economic Department Working Paper, 
ECO/WKP 20, 2002; P. Navarro and A. Spencer, ‘September 11, 2001: Assessing the 
Costs of Terrorism’, Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 2001; C. Rubin and I. 
Renda-Tanali, The Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Immediate Impacts and 
their Ramifications for Federal Emergency Management, Quick Response Report  # 140 
(University of Colorado; Colorado Natural Hazards Research and Applications 
Information Center 2001) and S. Wesbury, ‘September 11: One Year Later’. The 
Economic Cost of Terrorism, International Information Programs Electronic Journal, 
2002. 
7 One of the aspects that differentiates the conclusions of the studies according to their geographical scope 
of analysis, lies in the appraisal of the employment losses, since some were lost definitively, while others 
were relocated in other areas outside New York. 
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1) The cost of the rescue and initial attention for the victims of the attacks. 
 
2) The health cost of attention for the injured by Madrid’s hospital network. 
 
3) The cost of the human lives lost and of the injuries inflicted on the injured, 
considering the value of the compensation to be received by them. 
 
4) The loss of wages imputable to people that were injured in the attacks. 
 
5) The damages caused in the rail infrastructure, the rolling stock and in the 
houses that were damaged by the effect of the explosions.  
 
6) The cost of usage of the infrastructure available for the identification of the 
mortal victims and the attention to their relatives. 
 
7) The cost of the services of psychological attention created immediately after the 
attacks, together with those that have operated afterwards. 
 
8) And, finally, the opportunity cost which the citizens incurred in order to express 
their solidarity with the victims the day after the attacks. 
 
The evaluation of the direct costs imputable to the 11-M has taken place taking 
into account four main aspects: number of victims (dead and injured), number of people 
mobilized in tasks of service to the victims, material resources employed in these tasks 
such as vehicles and facilities and the inventory of damages to rail infrastructures and 
housings.  
 
For quantifying these variables we have two sources of information: journalistic 
—containing data referring to the biographies of the victims, to the events and the 
perceptions of the agents— and official ones —of the municipal, regional, national and 
professional institutions— whose data have been served mainly by the press offices. 
These sources have been supplemented with the carrying out of personal interviews with 
those responsible for the services involved. 
 
The evaluation of the personal damages, carried out in terms of compensations, 
has been made taking into account the scales settled down by the Ministry of the Interior 
in accordance with the Law 32/1999 of Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism and the 
Law 13/1996 of Fiscal, Administrative Measures and of the Social Order, of the Region 
of Madrid for the specific regulation of the same question, and to the Insurance Claims 
Department for the mandatory insurance of travellers. Also, regarding the personal 
biographies of the victims and the available data on the injured, we have settled a 
complementary valuation in terms of losses of human capital, following the habitual 
models in this kind of studies.  
 
On the other hand, the attention to the victims —mainly health and 
psychological— has been evaluated in terms of applying the standardized rates of the 
hospital and health system of Madrid, supplementing these data with the budgetary 
valuation of the newly-created service of psychological care.  
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Concerning the property damages, we have used the information on the queries 
presented in the Insurance Claims Department and in the Ministry of the Interior, 
together with the data provided by the City Council of Madrid. The information has 
been used on the queries presented in the Insurance Claims Department and in the 
Ministry of the Interior, as well as the data provided by the City Council of Madrid. 
Finally the valuation of the other services —mainly the ones stemming from the police 
and sanitary mobilization for the rescue and the initial attention of the victims, including 
the identification tasks and the funeral services— has been carried out taking into 
account the available data on the mobilized resources, their temporary duration, and the 
wages and other items budgeted for the corresponding institutions. In this respect, the 
only excluded concept, due to the lack of data, is the one referring to the mobilization of 
the national police during the hours immediately following the attacks.  
 
The figures obtained have been valued in comparative terms with regard to the 
size of the regional economy of Madrid and to the Spanish economy, as well as with 
regard to other terrorist events for which similar valuations were available —mainly the 
September 11 in the United States—.  
 
2. RESCUE AND THE INITIAL ATTENTION OF THE VICTIMS OF 
THE ATTACKS 
 
Just a few minutes after the attacks took place, still in the midst of the initial 
confusion that this type of events produces and under an unprecedented mobilisation, all 
available resources in Madrid to attend the victims were put into action. The apparatus 
of civil protection, the municipal and regional services, the national police and 
numerous voluntaries, including, in a special way, those coordinated by the College of 
Psychologists started the task of rescuing the injured travellers, attending and 
transferring them to the hospital’s emergency services; of removing the corpses, to 
transport them to the morgue set up in the IFEMA installations (one of Madrid’s trade 
fair sites) and to proceed to their identification; and to the one of giving comfort, 
psychological care and accompaniment to the thousands of families of the affected ones. 
In this section we evaluate the costs of this mobilization, but no assessment is made of 
the part corresponding to the psychological care. That is analyzed later on, although 
without taking into consideration, due to the lack of data, the amount corresponding to 
the police forces of the State and to the work carried out by the citizens who, without 
being enlisted as volunteers in the services of civil protection, and impelled by a feeling 
of solidarity, helped in the rescue tasks. 
 
The quantifying of the number of agents of the municipal police, Emergency 
Health Services, firemen and funeral services, of clean-up and social workers is based 
on the data published by the City Council of Madrid in their balance-sheet of the 
management of the March 11, and in the information broadcast by the media that, 
generally, are based on the documents cited.8 In total, as we show in table 1 slightly 
more than 5,000 people participated in the municipal apparatus.  
                                                 
8 See also SAMUR-Protección Civil, Clave 20, Revista interna del SAMUR-Protección 
Civil “Villa de Madrid”, (Madrid; June 2004). 
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For the evaluation of the attributable cost to this apparatus we have established 
first, two categories of employment depending on their salary, considering as high level 
employments those corresponding to professional health workers, firemen, social 
workers, psychologists and educators, and as half-level employments the remaining 
ones. Disaggregating in this way the group of mobilized people, we have charged to 
those of the lower category a cost of 16.4 euros/hour —and double that figure to those of 
the higher group— considering in both cases a working time of 20 hours, given the 
duration of the tasks carried out. These figures correspond to the estimation of the mean 
salary cost in the service sector of the Community of Madrid, for the first trimester of 
2004, according to the Quarterly Survey of Labour Costs elaborated by the National 
Statistical Office (INE). Its amount for each income level is confirmed by the data 
available on the remuneration of the police corps provided by the Police Federal Union 
and by those provided by the Firemen-Corps of the City Council of Madrid. The results 
obtained, which are reflected in table 1 allows us to estimate the cost after mobilizing 
staff at rather more than 1.95 million euros. 
 
On the other hand, in the different rescue tasks 1,213 municipal vehicles were 
used. For the valuation of this use, a standardized cost of 70 euros per day and vehicle 
considering the different types of vehicles used, their equipment and their operational 
lifetime. Keeping in mind that the mentioned tasks lasted for two days, the result that is 
shown in table 1 gives a total cost of nearly 0.17 million euros. 
 
Finally, we have considered the cost of the legal processes requiring that a judge 
must authorize the removal of a corpse from the scene of an accident and its transfer to 
the morgue, according to the 2004 rates of Funespaña —a Spanish group of companies 
specializing in funeral services, which includes the Combined Company of Funeral 
Services of Madrid, who were responsible for carrying out the task—. The result throws 
up a figure of 0.05 million euros. 
 
Summing up, the rescue activities and initial attention for the victims of the 
attacks of the March 11 accounted for something more than 2.17 million euros. 
Nevertheless it should be noted, that this figure has to be considered as a minimum, 
because it has not been possible to obtain data of the mobilization of the national police, 
nor on the civilians that participated in them voluntarily. 
 
Table 1: Valuation of the costs of the services of rescue and initial attention for the 
victims of the attacks of March 11. 
 
Mobilized persons (excluding National 
Police) and vehicles Number
Standard 
cost (€) 
Estimated cost 
(€) 
Municipal police 2,488   
SAMUR-Health professionals* 215   
SAMUR-Health volunteers 330   
Firemen* 259   
Volunteer firemen 50   
Funeral services 540   
Urban clearing services 120   
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Social services:    
Social workers* 260   
Psychologists* 150   
Educators* 60   
Intercultural mediators 35   
Auxiliaries 20   
Administrative 28   
Volunteers 460   
Distribution by income level:    
High income (*) 944 656 619,264 
Mean income (rest) 4,071 328 1,335,288 
TOTAL 5,015  1,954,552 
Vehicles - Municipal Police 942   
Vehicles - SAMUR 119   
Vehicles - Firemen 38   
Vehicles - funeral services 68   
Clearing machines 46   
TOTAL 1,213 140 169,820 
Funeral transport:    
Dead 191   
Died in Hospitals 14   
Total dead transported 177 297 52,503 
TOTAL   52,503 
Total cost of rescue (€)   2,176,875 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
3. THE HEALTH SERVICES 
 
The injured in the attacks, after being attended in situ, were transferred to 
different centres of the hospital network of the Community of Madrid. The Health and 
Consumer Board published from the same March 11 on the main data regarding the 
number of people attended and to their diagnosis, classifying them in different 
categories of severity. This has allowed us to carry out a detailed tracking of the 
situation of the victims during the three months following the attacks of March 11. 
 
In accordance with the official data of Health and Consumer Board, the hospitals 
from Madrid attended a total of 2,062 injured in the attacks. However, for 478 of them 
there is a complete lack of information as for their destination, so that we do not know if 
they were discharged or if they finished up in a hospital. It is probable that it has been a 
consequence of the initial confusion and the overflow of the emergency departments, so 
that double accounting costs may have taken place, due to incomplete registers that, later 
on, have not been corrected. Anyway, since there has been no information on these 
cases, following our conservative approach, we opted to exclude them from the 
valuation. In consequence, this last figure refers to the 1,584 injured for those is known 
to have hospitalised after being attended —which happened in 286 cases— or who were 
sent to casualty services —which corresponds to the 1,298 not hospitalized—. This 
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global figure of injured is similar to the one that has been issued from the judicial media 
by the Ministry of the Interior.9 
 
On the other hand, in the case of the hospitalized injured, we have estimated two 
categories for the estimation of the costs: one that includes those classified as slightly 
injured or of under observation, to whom we assigned a normal cost; and another one 
that includes the serious, very serious and critically injured, to whom we have imputed 
the cost of care in the intensive care units (ICU). 
 
The monetary values corresponding to these categories of costs are based on the 
standardized rates published by INSALUD,10 the public prices approved by the 
Community of Madrid11 and in the information given by the hospital Gregorio 
Marañón, which makes reference to the Report of Results of the Analytic Management 
of the financial year 2002, published by Madrid’s Health Institute. On the other hand, 
the cost allocated to the surgical operations is based on the information published by the 
Ministry of Health,12 taking into account the average of the prizes assigned to the most 
significant surgical operations in accordance with the necessities of those wounded in 
the attacks. 
 
The results obtained, which are presented in table 2, indicate a cost of health care 
of more than 5.15 million euros, caused in their biggest part by the necessities of the 
most seriously injured's hospital stay, as well as for the performance of 160 surgical 
operations. This estimation is, once again, incomplete, because of the lack of the 
information necessary to calculate the attributable value to the casualty care that had to 
be given to many victims of the attacks. 
 
 
Table 2: Costs of care for the victims 
 
Concepts Number Standard cost (€) Estimated health cost (€)
Injured attended 1,584   
From which    
Injured not hospitalized 1,298 270    350,460 
Injured hospitalized 286   
Day-person normal cost 4,512 430 1,940,160 
Day-person cost ICU 864 1,453 1,255,392 
TOTAL   3,195,552 
                                                 
9 In the Ministerio del Interior, Balance 2004, (Madrid; Dirección General de Relaciones Informativas y 
Sociales 2005), p. 191, the number of the wounded in the attacks of the March 11 are quoted as 1,600.  
10 resolution of December 26, 2001 of the General Direction of INSALUD (Official Bulletin of the State, 
of January 5 2001), on price review to apply to the health centres for care provided where the amount 
must be claimed from third parties responsible for payments or for users not covered by Social Security.  
11 agreement of August of 2001 (Official Bulletin of the Community of Madrid, of September 17 2001), 2 
for which you/they modify the total sums of the public prices for the benefit of the services and activities 
of the network of Sanitary Centers of the Community of Madrid. 
12 Actual Ordinance 1247/2002, of December (Official Bulletin of the State, of December 4, 2002) 3, by 
which the management of the Health Care Compensation Fund is regulated. 
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Injured hospitalized on 11-
06-04 9   
Mean hospitalization (days-
person) 18,7   
Future hospital stay of the 
wounded not yet hospitalized 168 430     72,258 
Surgery operations 160 9,616 1,538,608 
Total estimation health cost 
(€)  5,156,878 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
 
4. THE COMPENSATION TO THE VICTIMS 
 
The loss of human lives and the temporary or permanent physical disability of 
those who were injured in the attacks, over and above the moral consideration, involves 
an important cost for the whole society. This cost could be evaluated by different 
procedures related to the estimation of the human capital if enough information were 
available, but it is not our case. For this reason, it has been considered that this cost 
should be included in the compensations that the victims must receive for different 
concepts.13 
 
This aspect is the topic that has mainly attracted the attention of the written 
media, and different estimations have been published throughout the successive months 
after the attacks. In our case, we have preferred to make the necessary calculations so 
that, keeping in mind the laws that regulate these compensations,14 it could be possible 
to evaluate the final cost that will be assumed by the competent Public Administrations 
in this matter.  
 
                                                 
13 The studies about the September 11 have valued the loss of human lives following 
criteria based on the loss of earnings or income throughout the life (forgone lifetime 
income or earnings), for which some of them have used the average annual salary 
discounted to the present and others have tried to evaluate the losses of productivity 
considering the high remunerations of the workers of the World Trade Center. The 
General Accounting Office, Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center, 
(Washington, DC; GAO 2002), indicates some limitations to this method as "it 
generates higher values for individuals with higher income and lower values for 
volunteers and individual with lower income".  In our study we attempted to avoid this 
criticism by giving the official valuation as to the extent of compensation. This could be 
taken as a strict valuation of a life, regardless of its productive capacity.  In the Madrid 
attack there were no highly qualified workers with high wages, at least at a significant 
level, in contrast to the 9/11 attack in New York.  Since it was perpetrated against the 
public means of transportation the deceased were workers with low skill levels, in their 
majority immigrants, unemployed, and students. 
14 A complete compilation of the applicable legislation, as well as a summary of its main aspects, can be 
found in the website of the Ministry of the Interior [www.mir.es].  Also, another text of great interest 
regarding this topic has been published by the Asociación Víctimas del Terrorismo, Manual de autoayuda 
para víctimas de atentados terroristas, (Madrid; AVT 2004). 
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The compensations for the victims of the terrorism are paid by the State based 
on the legislation regarding solidarity with the victims of terrorism (Law 32/1999, of 
October 8th, of solidarity with the victims of the terrorism) that establishes a scale of 
minimum compensations that possibly can be increased by judicial decisions, as well as 
of the norms of compensations for damages as a result of terrorist attacks (Law 13/1996, 
of December 30th, of Fiscal, Administrative and Social Order Measures) referring both 
to injuries and to material damages. In the same way, the region of Madrid has set 
compensations for death in the case of terrorist attacks (Law 12/1996, of December 
19th, of Help to the Victims of Terrorism. In addition, we have to take into account in 
this case the compensation of the Insurance Claims Department, which is the entity that 
must assume the corresponding compensation regarding the obligatory insurance of 
travellers. 
 
In the same way, since most of the victims were workers on their way to their 
job centres, the compensation for accidents “in itinere” charged to the National Health 
System must also be considered. Finally an estimation of the compensations of the 
private insurance that could have been taken out by the deceased as a consequence of 
having bank accounts or of the existence of business life insurance has also been taken 
into account. 
 
In order to carry out the calculation of the compensations it has been necessary 
to establish the level of the injured’s physical disability, because this variable sets the 
quantities owed to the people that survive a terrorist attack. Since this information is not 
available, the hypothesis has been considered that a connection exists between the initial 
classification of the injured, according to their injuries and the handicap level, as 
explained in the table 3. For the cases of temporary physical disability that are 
assimilated to the non-hospitalized injured it has been considered a 15-day absence from 
work in order to evaluate the compensations paid by the Spanish Government. 
 
Table 3: Relation between injured categories and degrees of physical disability 
 
Grade of physical disability Category 
Critical and very seriously injured, not 
deceased Critical disablity 
Seriously injured Permanent physical disability (total) 
Slightly injured and under observation Permanent physical disability (partially) 
Treated and non-hospitalized Temporary physical disability 
 
 
Moreover, in the case of damages paid, in order to calculate compensation for 
children, an estimate of how many there were has been made, on the basis of the data 
which it has been possible to collect for the dead victims. More specifically, the latter 
are considered to be representative of the whole, so their characteristics of age and 
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family makeup have been projected onto the former.15 Thus, it has been possible to 
establish how many children are entitled to compensation, with those under 55 being 
considered as such. 
 
For the in itinere compensations paid to the heirs of the deceased, the calculation 
has been made according to the regulations of the Spanish National Health System and 
taking into account the social and demographic characteristics of the victims. 
Furthermore it has been supposed that the annual mean income of the victims was 
29,224 euros. 
 
With regard to private insurance, it has been considered that the workers killed 
in the attacks had signed an accident insurance policy as well as a life insurance policy 
with charge to the company in which they were working. In order to evaluate the 
compensations due to this kind of risks it has been supposed that the characteristics of 
the policy in the first case are the same as those established by one of the biggest 
national banks —specifically the BBVA16— and in the second case to the ones stipulated 
in a standard policy of Vitalicio Seguros for the low income level victims, using the 
criteria of assigning an amount equivalent to twice the mean annual income in the 
Region of Madrid in 2004 in the case of the workers with a high income level. 
 
Finally, the information given by the Insurance Claims Department has been 
used for the compensations covered by this institution which is responsible for the 
whole of the possible proceedings that could be opened due to the attacks. 
 
The results of the estimates made in this chapter are shown in table 4. The total 
sum of compensations is 134.12 million euros, of which 62.8 per cent belongs to the 
compensations of the Law of Solidarity with victims of terrorist attacks (41.1 per cent) 
and also the general compensations (21.7 per cent) paid by the Spanish Interior 
Ministry, which is the mainly responsible body for economic attention to the victims in 
this terrorist event.17 It is also important to consider the contributions of the Insurance 
Claims Department,18 with 27.8 per cent; private insurance, with 4.2 per cent; the 
                                                 
15 The number of deceased workers, their distribution by types of employment and the number of children 
per worker has been evaluated considering the information collected in the obituaries of the victims 
published by the “El Mundo” newspaper. 
16 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
17 The definitive balance of the compensation managed from the Ministry of the Interior will still take 
some time to be completed, because of the administrative requirements and the definitive verifications of 
the damage which inevitably delay the processing of the open dossiers.  The latest published information 
on this matter points out that in June of 2005 the completed dossiers added up to 47.57 million euros;  
that is, only 56 per cent of the amount estimated by us. See “El Mundo”, June 19, 2005, regional 
supplement of Madrid, page 3, for the data of the Ministry of the Interior. 
18 The Insurance Claims Department (Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros) is a 
public organization, assigned to the Ministry of Economy, created provisionally in 
1941, which acquired a definitive character in 1945. It has a subsidiary character, acting 
generally as a direct insurer, where the private market is not involved, or as a Guarantee 
Fund when certain circumstances arise, for example, lack of insurance, insolvency of 
the insurer, etc. The existence of this Institution has reduced the costs which the private 
sector has incurred as a result of March 11, in contrast to the attacks of the September 
11 which originated serious insurance problems to the private organizations, most of 
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compensations of the regional government of Madrid, with 3.1 per cent and finally the 
contribution of the Spanish National Health System with 2.1 per cent. 
 
Table 4: Cost of the compensations to the victims 
 
Concepts Equivalent to: Number 
Compensation 
(€) 
Estimated 
cost (€) 
1. NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT     
Decease Deceased 191 138,232 26,402,312 
Critical disablity Critical and very seriously injured not deceased 43 390,657 16,798,251 
Permanent physical 
disability (total) Seriously injured 140 48,080 6,731,200 
Permanent physical 
disability (partially)
Slightly injuried and under 
observation 90 36,060 3,245,400 
Temporary physical 
disability Treated and not hospitalized 1,297 1,514 1,963,658 
TOTAL    55,140,821 
2.  DAMAGES PAID     
Decease Deceased 191 59,865 11,434,215 
Critical disablity Critical and very seriously injured not deceased 43 64,470 2,772,210 
Permanent physical 
disability (total) Serious injured 140 32,235 4,512,900 
Permanent physical 
disability (partially)
Slight injuried and under 
observation 90 23,025 2,072,250 
Temporary physical 
disability Treated and not hospitalized 1,297 461 597,269 
Compensation for children  841 9,210 7,744,505 
TOTAL    29,133,348 
3.  REGION OF MADRID     
Decease Deceased 191 21,869 4,176,979 
TOTAL    4,176,979 
4. ICD (Insurance Claims 
Depatment))     
Paid compensations Personal and material damage   29,355,505 
Predicted compensations Personal and material damage   7,923,812 
TOTAL    37,279,317 
5.  “IN ITINERE” 
ACCIDENTS (Spanish 
NHS)
    
Decease (Workers) [6 monthly payment+1 per child (0.52 children)]* 174 15,890 2,764,860 
                                                                                                                                               
them from Europe, thus exporting the impact of the costs of the attack.  The insurance 
losses of the insurance agencies after the September 11 were valued between 30 and 58 
billion dollars. As a consequence, the insuring companies raised the premiums and 
reduced the coverage. 
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TOTAL    2,764,860 
6. PRIVATE INSURANCE     
Decease (Workers) Bank accounts 175 6,000 1,050,000 
Decease (Workers) Company insurance (High level jobs) 38 55,500 2,109,000 
Company insurance (Low-Medium 
level jobs) 137 18,000 2,466,000 
TOTAL    5,625,000 
Total compenations (€)    134,120,325
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
 
 
5. THE WAGE LOSSES OF THE INJURED  
 
As a consequence of the injuries suffered, the workers affected by the attacks 
had to go on sick leave during a certain period of time. Such situation caused important 
wage losses that, apart from being compensated by social benefits, should be taken into 
account when assessing the costs of the terrorist acts of March 11. Therefore, the 
number of people affected by this situation is the first element that must be analyzed. 
Due to the lack of data on the social and demographic profile of the injured, as done in 
the previous epigraph for the calculation of the compensations, it has been considered 
that the proportion of employed among the injured is the same as the one estimated for 
the deceased —91.6 per cent—. 
 
On the other hand, the data about the injured used in this section are those 
provided by the Region of Madrid and they are summarized in Annex 1.  In addition, it 
has been supposed that the non-hospitalized injured attended by the sanitary services 
have had a two-week sick leave, which corresponds to 10 working days. In the case of 
the hospitalized injured, the wage loss has been estimated per natural days, and not per 
working days.  With regard to the injured who still remained hospitalized in June 2004, 
it has been supposed, again with a conservative criterion, that their sick leave would 
extend with an additional time corresponding to the average sick leave of the total group 
of the injured registered until that moment. 
 
The cost assigned to each one of the lost working days is equivalent to the average that 
has been calculated by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) in its Quarterly 
Survey of Labor Costs for the whole group of the employed people in the Region of 
Madrid in the first quarter of 2004. The data are summarized in table 5. 
 
Table 5: Working hours and labor costs in the region of Madrid during the first quarter 
of 2004. 
 
Concepts Values 
Effective hours per worker and month 
(Madrid)
146,1 
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Daily working hours 7,305 
Labor cost of effective hour (Madrid) 16,45 € 
Working day standard cost 120,2 € 
Average monthly wage cost in 2004 
(Madrid)
2,435.3 € 
Source: INE 
 
 
Taking all the considerations made into account, in table 6 are shown the results of the 
estimate carried out, which concludes that the loss of wages of the injured in the attacks 
of March 11 turned out to be of 2.37 million euros. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Wage loss suffered by the injured in the terrorist attacks 
 
Concepts Number Standard cost (€) Estimated cost (€) 
Non-hospitalized Injured 1,189   
Days of  Sick leave (injured) 10   
Days-Person 11,890 120,20 1,429,178 
Hospitalized injured 262   
Days-Person 11,728 80,11    939,530 
Hospitalized injured at 11-06-04 8   
Average sick leave 11,36   
Future average sick leave of non-
discharged injured 90,88 80,11         7,280 
Total losses (€)   2,375,988 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
 
6. THE DAMAGES IN INFRASTRUCTURES AND HOUSINGS. 
 
The attacks of March 11, apart from the loss of human lives, caused serious 
damages in the suburban railway infrastructure of Madrid, as well as in some houses 
near the place of the attack.  In the first case, the damage caused both the partial 
destruction of the trains where the bombs went off —which meant the loss of three 
locomotives and five coaches in three model 446 trains, and of another two coaches in 
model 450 train— and the damages caused to the railway installations and the stations. 
In the latter case, the attacks caused damage in 114 houses. 
 
With regard to the damage to the facilities and infrastructures of the Spanish 
Railways (RENFE), the data provided by the Corporate Headquarters of Finances and 
Administration of this public company have been considered for the evaluation, as well 
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as the periodic financial information published by the National Commission of the 
Stock Market about the Spanish Railway Infrastructure Administrator (ADIF).19 
 
The data published by the City Council of Madrid in their "Balance of 
intervention of the municipal services in the rescue and attention of the victims of 11-
M” has been taken into account for the calculation of the damage in the houses.  The 
number of damaged houses has been evaluated by the technicians of the City Council 
and a cost equivalent to the average of the compensation paid for damage caused by 
terrorism by the Insurance Claims Department in the period 2000-2002 has been 
applied. 
 
The obtained results are shown in table 7. These data indicate a total cost of 5.26 
million euros. 71.8 per cent corresponds to the railway rolling stock, that is to say, the 
residual value of the destroyed units estimated as 3.78 million euros. Following the 
established accounting criteria, the cost of replacement of the railway material has not 
been considered, estimated in 17 million euros, an amount which corresponds to the 
acquisition of three new suburban model CIVIA 465 trains. However, the damage 
caused in the RENFE installations hardly exceeds 0.21 million euros and that caused 
ones in houses has been estimated in 1.27 million euros. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Damage in infrastructures and housing 
 
Concepts Number Standard cost (€) 
Estimated cost 
(€) 
Repair of damage to housing 114 11,136 1,269,542 
Damage in RENFE 
installations  218,000 218,000 
Damages in RENFE trains  3,782,000 3,782,000 
Total damages (€)   5,269,542 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
 
7. THE PAVILLION Nº 6 IN IFEMA. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Several of the items of information on the costs of the September 11 have used the 
estimations of the U.S. national accounts in order to evaluate the destruction of physical 
assets.  The property losses are reflected as an increase in the consumption of fixed 
capital.  Others, as made by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, use the 
replacement value of the destroyed building, contents of the destroyed buildings, cost of 
repairs to damaged buildings and infrastructure (public transportation and utilities) and 
site cleanup. 
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Due to the space limitations of the Anatomical and Forensic Institute of Madrid, 
in order to be able to perform the autopsy and identification tasks of the fatal victims of 
the attacks in suitable conditions, the competent authorities made the decision to 
transfer those activities to pavilion 6 of the Trade Fair of Madrid (IFEMA).  In these 
facilities, as well as in some additional rooms of pavilions 7, 8 and 9, an important 
activity took place aimed at offering attention to the hundreds of relatives who went 
there to seek information and to take charge of the mortal remains of their relatives. 
 
In order to evaluate the costs of the use of the IFEMA facilities —including 
service contracted to take care of the catering needs during the days in which the events 
happened— the details published in the report elaborated by the Official College of 
Psychologists have studied the first organised psychological attention, as well as the 
news appearing in the “El Pais” newspaper exactly one year after the attacks.  It has 
been possible to establish accurately which and how long the facilities were used.  With 
this data evaluation of the costs has been carried out taking into account the tariffs that, 
in each case, IFEMA applies. As regards the cost of catering, the average of the prices 
applied by the accredited companies that carry out this kind of services in the Trade fair 
of Madrid has been considered. 
 
The obtained results are shown in table 8 which indicates that the total cost 
caused by the use of IFEMA facilities was 0.18 million euros. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Cost of IFEMA facilities 
 
Concepts Number Standard cost (€) Estimated cost (€) 
Pavillion 6:    
Days 6 15,785 94,710 
Extra hours 16 1,579 25,264 
“Retiro” conference hall:    
Days 2 2,297 4,594 
Extra hours 16 230 3,680 
Conference halls (6) in 
pavillion 7,8 y 9:    
Days 2 2,130 4,260 
Hours 16 216 3,456 
Catering:    
People 3,000 15 45,000 
Total IFEMA (€)   180,964 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad 
Complutense 
 
 
8. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTENTION TO THE VICTIMS. 
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Just a few hours after the terrorist attacks, the psychological attention services 
for the victims and their relatives were put into operation. These services consisted of 
direct interventions among the affected people —mainly in IFEMA and the hospitals— 
and a telephone attention coordinated with the 112 emergency services.  The Official 
College of Psychologists of Madrid20 took care of the coordination of these services and 
has offered, as already indicated, detailed information of this work, which has allowed 
us to obtain the necessary data in order to carry out an economic evaluation.  Also, after 
the attacks, the Region of Madrid made the decision to organize a special service of 
psychological attention by means of the engagement of new staff for 18 months in order 
to take care of the additional necessities.  
 
In order to evaluate the cost of the voluntary services given by the psychologists 
of Madrid, their opportunity cost has been considered according to the information 
detailed below. The average duration of the psychological services has been estimated 
as 2 hours/case for direct attention, 4 hours/case for attention at home and 0.25 
hours/case for telephone attention. The cost of each working hour corresponds to 32.8 
euros/hour, equivalent to double the 2004 average wage cost for the service sector in the 
Madrid Region.  The service of the special group organized by the 112 emergency 
service carried out 351 eight-hour shifts with a cost similar to the previously mentioned 
(32.8 euros/hour). 
 
Regarding the cost of the engagement of new psychiatrists and psychologists by 
Region of Madrid to reinforce the services in this medical field, it has been assigned 
double the 2004 average wage cost in the Madrid Region;  that is, 58,448 euros/year, 
during a year and a half. 
 
The results of the estimation are shown in table 9. It can be appreciated that the 
psychological attention of the victims is valued at almost 4.94 million euros; an amount 
that emerges as a result of the activities carried out after the attacks by the Madrid 
Region.  In fact, these services include the 88.6 per cent of the cost considered in this 
chapter, whereas the remaining 11.4 per cent is completed by the cost of the immediate 
attention services at the moment of the attacks.  
 
Table 9: Cost of psychological attention to the victims 
 
Concepts Number Standard cost (€) Estimated cost (€) 
       Immediate assistance after the 
attacks :     
People attended in situ 5,000 66 328,000 
People attended at home 183 131 24,010 
                                                 
20 See A. Lillo et al., ‘Intervención psicológica tras los atentados del 11 de marzo en 
Madrid’, Clínica y Salud, Revista Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid, vol. 15, 
2004. and ‘Asistencia psicológica urgente: organización y desarrollo durante el 11-M’ 
in A. Blanco, R. del Águila and J.M. Sabucedo, Madrid 11-M. Un análisis del mal y sus 
consecuencias, (Madrid; Trotta 2005). 
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People attended by telephone 13,540 8 111,028 
TOTAL   463,038 
112 Special Group  (11 to 15 of 
march) 351 262 92,102 
Psychological attention service of 
the Region of Madrid (18 meses):    
Engagement of 35 psychiatrists and 
15 psychologists 50 87,672 4,383,600 
Total psychological assistance (€)   4,938,740 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
 
9. THE COST OF SOLIDARITY:  THE DEMONSTRATION OF 12-M 
 
On the 12th March 2004, one day after the attacks, more than two million 
Madrileños expressed their solidarity with the victims by taking part in the 
demonstration organized in the streets of the Spanish capital.  That day, the accesses to 
Madrid were completely blocked by the enormous amount of people who came from the 
surrounding towns and villages of Madrid from early afternoon. Working activity was 
suspended in a great number of companies in order to facilitate attendance at the 
demonstration. This cessation of the activities during half a day must be considered if 
we try to establish the cost of solidarity. 
 
It has been considered that the people who attended the demonstration constitute 
a representative sample of the Madrid population, so that the employment rate of the 
whole Region of Madrid can be applied to them. An estimation is therefore obtained of 
the number of employed people present in the demonstration and it has been assumed 
that the people worked only half a working day, the other half being used to express 
solidarity.  The data about the number of people present have been collected through 
information published in press and the data offered by the National Statistics Institute 
(INE) about the working population of Madrid. 
 
As is shown in table 10, it has been considered that if the number of people who 
attended the demonstration was 2,300,000, more than 950,000 people were active 
workers.  The total cost of the working hours lost, considering the data shown in table 5, 
has been estimated at something more than 57.36 million euros. 
 
Table 10: Cost of the March 12th demonstration 
 
Concepts Number Standard cost (€) 
Estimated cost 
(€) 
March 12th demonstration    
Population of the Region of 
Madrid 5,804,829   
Per cent of Active 
population (employed) of 
the whole population in the 
42   
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Region of Madrid 
Attendance at the 
demonstration 2,300,000   
People at the demonstration  
(employed) (relative to the 
active population in the 
Region of Madrid)
954,500 60,10 57,365,450 
Total cost of the 
demonstration (€)   57,365,450 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
 
10. FINAL CONCLUSIONS. 
 
The results of the evaluation of the economic costs that can be attributed to the 
attacks of March 11 are shown in table 11.  This evaluation has been made by means of 
the application of conservative criteria to avoid any exaggeration in the obtained 
amounts.  Therefore, these quantities have to be considered as the minimum direct cost 
that the attacks have involved for the Madrilenian economy. 
 
The studies about the incidence of terrorism on the economy of the countries or 
the regions in which their actions happen emphasize that, generally, even when the 
attacks are of great significance, the damages caused usually have a limited effect, only 
if they are considered individually and the terrorist threat is not persistent over time. 
Terrorism is a war of low intensity that produces a certain weakening on the economy 
of the societies that are attacked. This weakening only becomes significant when the 
campaigns of attacks persist over time. This hypothesis is confirmed by the data 
collected in this work which confirm that the direct influence of the attacks of March 11 
in Madrid has been limited. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the police and legal 
control has contributed decisively to the lack of the terrorist persistence. 
 
 
 
 Table 11: Summary of the immediate economic costs  
of the terrorist attack on March /11 at Madrid. 
 
 
Concepts Euros 
RESCUE AND INITAL ATTENTION TO THE 
VICTIMS 2,176,875 
HEALTH COST OF THE ATTENTION TO THE  
VICTIMS 5,156,878 
COMPENSATION TO THE VICTIMS 134,120,325 
WAGE LOSS OF THE VICTIMS 2,375,988 
DAMAGES IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
HOUSING 5,269,542 
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IFEMA 180,964 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE 
VICTIMS 4,938,740 
MARCH 12th DEMONSTRATION 57,365,450 
 TOTAL COST (€) 211,584,762 
Source: Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF) – Universidad Complutense 
 
 
 
The total amount obtained turns out to be more than 211.58 million euros. 63.4 
per cent of this number corresponds to the loss of 191 human lives and to the injuries 
caused in almost 1,600 people affected directly by the attacks. The damages have been 
valued based on the compensation that the victims are eligible to perceive.  A second 
important concept is the amount caused by the expression of the solidarity of the society 
with those affected by the attacks. More than one quarter of the total cost considered by 
this study is related to the demonstration of March 12, 2004.  In third and fourth place, 
with an equivalent value around 2.5 per cent appears the damage caused in railway 
infrastructures and housing, as well as the health cost of attention to the victims.  
Finally, with smaller participation the remaining evaluated concepts appear. 
 
If we consider the relative dimension of the attacks with respect to the size of the 
regional economy instead of its absolute value, it can be verified that the cost of the 
attacks was equivalent to 0.16 per cent of the GIP of the Region of Madrid in 2004.  
With regard to the economy of Spain, that cost hardly reaches 0.03 per cent of the 
national GDP. As we can see, they are relatively small numbers, which confirms the 
previously enunciated hypothesis.  This conclusion is similar to that obtained by the 
studies on other attacks of great significance. Thus, in the case of the attacks of 11 
September 2001 in New York, the New York City Partnership has considered that the 
direct costs rose to 0.79 per cent of the GDP of the United States in that year. 
 
 
http://www.ucm.es/bucm/cee/iaif     
        Working Paper Nº 54 
 
 
 25
REFERENCES 
 
A. Abadie and J. Gardeazabal (2001) “The economic costs of conflict: a case-control study for 
the Basque country”, NBR Working Paper, nº 8478 
 
C. Álvarez de Toledo, C. (2004): 4 días de marzo, Editorial Planeta, Barcelona. 
 
Asociación Víctimas del terrorismo (2004): Manual de autoayuda para víctimas de atentados 
terroristas, Madrid. 
 
Becker, G. and Murphy, K. (2001). “Prosperity Will Rise Out of the Ashes” Wall Street 
Journal, October 29, 2001.  
 
Benzo, F. (2004): Héroes inesperados. La otra cara del 11–M,Editorial Temas de hoy, Madrid. 
 
Blanco, A., del Águila, R., Sabucedo, J.M. (Eds.) (2005): Madrid 11-M. Un análisis del mal y 
sus consecuencias, Editorial Trotta, Madrid. 
 
Buesa, M. ( Dir.) (2004) Economía de la Secesión. El proyecto nacionalista y el País Vasco. 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid. 
 
Buesa, M. (2005): Guerra y terrorismo: el modelo de economía depredadora de guerra, 
Documento de Trabajo nº 50, Instituto de Análisis Industrial y Financiero, Universidad 
Complutense, Madrid, Mayo. 
 
City of New York Office of the Comptroller (2001) , The Impact of the September 11 WTC 
Attack on NYC’s Economy and City Revenues (Oct. 4, 2001). 
 
De Diego, E. (2004): Días de infamia, Editorial Letras Libres, Madrid. 
 
Enders, W. and  Sandler, T ( 1991) Causality between Transnational Terrorism on tourism: the 
case of Spain”. Tourism 14 (1) pp. 49-58. 
 
Enders, W. and  Sandler, T ( 1996) “Terrorism and Foreign Direct Investment in Spain and 
Greece” KyKlos, vol. 49 ( 3), pp. 331-352. 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2002) Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack 
on New York City, by Bram, O. and Rapaport; and New York City’s Economy before 
and after September 11, by Bram.  
  
Fiscal Policy Institute (2001), World Trade Center Job Impacts Take a Heavy Toll on Low 
Wage Workers (Nov. 5, 2001). 
 
Fiscal Policy Institute (2002), The Employment Impact of the September 11World Trade Center 
Attacks: Updated Estimates Based on theBenchmarked Employment Data (Mar. 8, 
2002). 
 
Frey B., Luechinger, S., Stutzer, A. (2004): “Calculating tragedy: assessing the costs of 
terrorism”. CESifo, Working Paper nº 1341, Munich (Alemania), Noviembre. 
 
García Abadillo, C. (2004): 11-M, La venganza, Editorial La Esfera de los Libros, Madrid. 
 
http://www.ucm.es/bucm/cee/iaif     
        Working Paper Nº 54 
 
 
 26
General Accounting Office (2002) Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the Word Trade Center, 
GAO-02-700R. Washington, DC. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2001) World Economic Outlook – The Global Economy After 
September 11, December, 2001.  
 
Lenain, P. Bonturi, M and Koen V. (2002) The Economic Consequences of Terrorism. 
Economic Department Working Paper. OECD. ECO/WKP(2002)20. 
www.oecd.org/eco. 
 
Lillo, A. et al. (2004): “Intervención psicológica tras los atentados del 11 de marzo en Madrid”, 
Clínica y Salud, Revista Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid Volumen 15. 
 
Lillo, A. et al. (2005): “Asistencia psicológica urgente: organización y desarrollo durante el 11–
M”, incluido en Blanco, A., del Águila, R., Sabucedo, J.M. (Eds.) (2005). 
 
Milken Institute (2002), The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Metropolitan Economies (Jan. 
2002).  
 
Ministerio del Interior (2005): Balance 2004, Dirección General de Relaciones Informativas y 
Sociales, Madrid. 
 
Münkler, H. (2002): Die Neuen Kriege, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn. 
 
Navarro, P. and Spencer A. (2001), "September 11, 2001: Assessing the Costs of 
Terrorism," Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 2001, Milken Institute. 
 
New York Governor and State Division of the Budget (2001), Rebuild New York–Renew 
America: The World Trade Center Attacks; Current Estimated Cost; and other 
supporting documents (Oct. 9, 2001). 
 
New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce (2002) , Economic Impact of the 
September 11th Attack on New York City (Nov. 2001; rev. Feb.11, 2002).  
 
New York State Assembly Ways and Means Committee Staff (2002), NewYork State Economic 
Report (Mar. 2002). 
 
New York State Office of the State Comptroller. (2003) 2003-04 Budget Analysis. Review of 
Economic and revenue forecast. Office of Budget and policy Analysis. March 2003 
 
New York State Senate Finance Committee Staff (2002), Financial Impact of the World Trade 
Center Impact, prepared by DRI-WEFA (Jan. 2002). 
 
OECD (2002) “Economic Consequences of Terrorism” OECD Economic Outlook, June 2002. 
 
OECD (2002) The impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on international trading 
and transport activities. Working Party of trade Committee, March, TD/TC/WP(2002) 
9/FINAL. 
 
Pestana, C. (2003) “ An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism: the Spanish ETA Case” Defence 
and Peace Economics vol 14(6) pp 401-412. 
 
http://www.ucm.es/bucm/cee/iaif     
        Working Paper Nº 54 
 
 
 27
Reinares, F. y Elorza, A. (2004): El  nuevo terrorismo islamista, Editorial Temas de Hoy, 
Madrid. 
 
Rubin, C. and Renda-Tanali (2001) The Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Immediate 
Impacts and their Ramifications for Federal Emergency Management. Natural Hazards 
Research and Applications Information Center. University of Colorado. Quick 
Response Report  # 140.   
 
SAMUR-Protección Civil (2004): Clave 20, Revista interna del SAMUR-Protección Civil 
“Villa de Madrid”, Número especial, Junio. 
 
Saxton, J. (2002): The economic costs of terrorism, Joint Economic Committee, United States 
Congress,  Washington DC, EEUU.  
 
Uriarte, E. (2004): Terrorismo y democracia tras el 11–M, Editorial Espasa, Madrid. 
 
Wesbury, S. (2002): The Economic Cost of Terrorism. International Information Programs 
Electronic Journal “September 11: One Year Later”. 
 http://usinfo.satate.gov/journals/itgic/0902/ijge/gj02.htm. 
 
 
http://www.ucm.es/bucm/cee/iaif     
        Working Paper Nº 54 
 
 
 28
Annex 1:  Evolution of the injured in the attacks for three months after the 11-M. 
Day People attended Deceased 
Discharged 
from 
hospital 
Not 
available Hospitalized Critical 
Very 
seriously 
injured 
Seriously 
injured 
Slightly 
injured 
Under 
observation
Surgical 
operations 
(accumulated)
11-M 1430 9 457 464 500       
12 1463 9 713 455 286 18 38 140 47 43  
13 1511 9 758 478 266 17 41 138 42 28  
14 1579 9 843 472 255 14 38 123 56 25  
15 1647 11 928 465 243 11 34 108 69 21 108 
16 1668 11 972 465 220 9 24 120 47 20  
17 1763 12 1079 478 194 7 19 112 37 19  
18 1771 12 1092 478 189 7 19 109 36 18  
19 1793 12 1123 478 180 6 18 106 35 15  
20 1815 12 1154 478 171 5 17 103 34 12  
21 1838 12 1185 479 162 4 16 100 33 9  
22 1860 12 1216 479 153 3 15 97 32 6  
23 1882 12 1247 479 144 2 14 94 31 3  
24 1905 13 1280 478 134 2 13 89 28 2 122 
25 1918 13 1303 478 124 2 12 81 27 2 125 
26 1920 13 1319 478 110  14 72 23 1 143 
27 1936 13 1339 477 107  14 69 23 1  
28 1952 13 1359 476 104  14 66 22 2  
29 1969 13 1378 478 100  13 64 21 2 143 
30 1986 14 1400 478 94  10 61 21 2 144 
31 2016 14 1434 478 90  10 54 25 1 147 
1-A 2029 14 1454 478 83  10 49 22 2 148 
2 2044 14 1474 478 78  8 42 25 3 149 
3 2046 14 1479 478 75  7 40 25 3  
4 2048 14 1484 478 72  7 38 25 2  
5 2050 14 1489 478 69  6 36 25 2  
6 2051 14 1493 478 66  6 34 24 2  
7 2053 14 1498 478 63  5 32 24 2  
8 2055 14 1503 478 60  5 30 24 1  
9 2057 14 1508 478 57  4 28 24 1  
10 2058 14 1512 478 54  4 26 23 1  
11 2060 14 1517 478 51  3 24 23 1  
12 2061 14 1523 478 46  2 20 23 1 159 
13 2062 14 1525 478 45  2 20 22 1 159 
14 2062 14 1526 478 44  2 20 21 1 160 
15 2062 14 1526 478 44  2 20 21 1 160 
16 2062 14 1529 478 41   20 21  160 
17 2062 14 1529 478 41   20 21   
18 2062 14 1529 478 41   20 21   
19 2062 14 1530 478 40   18 22  160 
20 2062 14 1531 478 39   18 21  160 
21 2062 14 1532 478 38   17 21  160 
22 2062 14 1536 478 34   15 19  160 
23 2062 14 1540 478 30   13 17  160 
24 2062 14 1540 478 30   13 17   
25 2062 14 1544 478 26   11 15   
26 2062 14 1547 478 23   9 14  160 
27 2062 14 1547 478 23   8 15  160 
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Day People attended Deceased 
Discharged 
from 
hospital 
Not 
available Hospitalized Critical 
Very 
seriously 
injured 
Seriously 
injured 
Slightly 
injured 
Under 
observation
Surgical 
operations 
(accumulated) 
28 2062 14 1547 478 23   7 16  160 
29 2062 14 1548 478 22   7 15  160 
30 2062 14 1549 478 21   7 14  160 
1-M 2062 14 1549 478 21   7 14   
2 2062 14 1549 478 21   7 14   
3 2062 14 1549 478 21   7 14  160 
4 2062 14 1549 478 21   7 14  160 
5 2062 14 1549 478 21   7 14   
6 2062 14 1549 478 21   7 14   
7 2062 14 1550 478 20   7 13   
8 2062 14 1550 478 20   7 13   
9 2062 14 1551 478 19   7 12   
10 2062 14 1551 478 19   7 12   
11 2062 14 1552 478 18   6 12   
12 2062 14 1552 478 18   6 12   
13 2062 14 1552 478 18   6 12   
14 2062 14 1553 478 17   6 11   
15 2062 14 1553 478 17   6 11   
16 2062 14 1553 478 17   6 11   
17 2062 14 1553 478 17   6 11   
18 2062 14 1554 478 16   6 10   
19 2062 14 1554 478 16   6 10   
20 2062 14 1554 478 16   6 10   
21 2062 14 1555 478 15   6 9   
22 2062 14 1555 478 15   6 9   
23 2062 14 1555 478 15   6 9   
24 2062 14 1555 478 15   6 9   
25 2062 14 1556 478 14   6 8   
26 2062 14 1556 478 14   6 8   
27 2062 14 1556 478 14   6 8   
28 2062 14 1557 478 13   5 8   
29 2062 14 1557 478 13   5 8   
30 2062 14 1557 478 13   5 8   
1-J 2062 14 1557 478 13   5 8   
2 2062 14 1558 478 12   5 7   
3 2062 14 1558 478 12   5 7   
4 2062 14 1558 478 12   5 7   
5 2062 14 1559 478 11   5 6   
6 2062 14 1559 478 11   5 6   
7 2062 14 1559 478 11   5 6   
8 2062 14 1560 478 10   5 5   
9 2062 14 1560 478 10   5 5   
10 2062 14 1561 478 9   5 4   
11 2062 14 1561 478 9   5 4  160 
 
Source: Own elaboration from data provided by the Region of Madrid 
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Annex 2:  Dossiers of the Insurance Claims Department related to 11-M. 
 
Concept Number 
Personal 
injuries    
       
  By decease     
   Finished 185 
   Refused 2 
   Unresolved offer 4 
   Offer not paid 1 
   Total 192 
       
  By injuries     
   Finished 647 
   Refused 106 
   Payment pending 84 
   Pending 73 
   Without payment 102 
   Total 1,012 
       
 Refused   130 
  Total    1,335  
       
Material 
damages     
       
   Finished 36 
   Not finished 22 
   Unresolved offer 1 
   Pending without offer 2 
   Total 61 
       
Total Dossiers   1,396 
Source: Own elaboration from data provided by the ICD 
 
Note:  According to the Insurance Claims Department, a total amount of 29,355,505 € 
has been already paid for compensation, as well as the foreseen amount of 7,923,812 €  
(still not paid) which represents a total sum of 37,279,317 €. 
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